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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of the timing of childbirth on capital accumulation
and welfare in a simple overlapping generations model, where each agent lives for four
periods and works for two periods. We show that delayed childbearing not only reduces
population, but also generates ﬂuctuations in the age composition of workers in the
labor force. This causes the aggregate saving rate to ﬂuctuate, which leads to cycles in
the capital–labor ratio. When all agents delay childbearing, we analytically show that
both the capital–labor ratio and the welfare of all agents can fall in the long run, despite
the population decline. When a fraction of agents delay childbearing, it has diﬀerential
welfare eﬀects on agents depending on their positions in the demographic cycles. The
eﬀects of lower lifetime fertility and technological progress are also examined.
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1 Introduction
Consider a fall in population induced by a decline in the number of births in the economy,
taking as given mortality and migration. It is well known that a lower population growth
raises the capital–labor ratio in the Solow–Swan growth model. The same property holds in
Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model, and it enhances welfare as long as the econ-
omy is dynamically eﬃcient; i.e., when the interest rate exceeds the population growth rate.
Of course, the declining birth rate can cause welfare problems when the population size has
some positive externality, or when social security systems are explicitly considered.1 Apart
from these issues, it has been generally perceived that the population decline is favorable to
economic welfare.2
This paper considers an overlapping generations model without external eﬀects or a social
security system. Nonetheless, we show that a population decline can worsen the welfare of
agents if it is caused by a change in the timing of childbirth or, more speciﬁcally, when many
people decide to delay childbearing to older ages.
Delayed childbearing has been broadly observed in developed countries. Between 1975
and 2005, the fraction of Japanese children who were born to mothers in their 20s decreased
from 75% to 45%, whereas those born to mothers in their 30s increased from 20% to 52%. A
similar trend is observed in the United States and advanced European countries (Gustafsson
and Kalwij 2006), and also in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Sardon 2006). Inter-
estingly, as pointed out by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), even when the cohort’s lifetime
fertility rate (the number of children a mother has in her lifetime) does not fall, the delayed
childbearing alone leads to a decline in the number of childbirths, measured by the total
period fertility rates (TPFRs). Ogawa and Retherford (1993), Kohler et al. (2002), and
Sobotka (2004) conﬁrmed that, to a certain extent, the delay of marriage and motherhood is
1To support a pay-as-you-go pension system, the economy must have enough children. For the relationship
between endogenous fertility and optimal social security, see Zhang and Zhang (2007) and Yew and Zhang
(2009).
2A notable exception is d’Albis (2007), which showed that when agents are uncertain about the length
of their life and there is a perfect annuity market, the capital–labor ratio may respond nonmonotonically to
the population growth rate.
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responsible for the observed period fertility rate decline (now known as the “tempo eﬀect”).
The seminal studies that incorporated the tempo eﬀect into economic theory are Happel
et al. (1984) and Cigno and Ermisch (1989). These studies constructed models where women
endogenously choose the timing of childbearing considering the fact that childbearing inter-
rupts their work experience for a certain period, which aﬀects their lifetime income proﬁles
through their career paths or the accumulation of human capital.3 Incorporating this idea
into the theory of economic growth, Iyigun (2000), Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Mullin
and Wang (2002), and d’Albis et al. (2010) constructed dynamic general equilibrium models
where the timing of childbirth is endogenous.4
Complementary to these preceding studies, this paper focuses on the aspect that delayed
childbearing changes the age structure of the labor force. When a considerable fraction of
mothers begin to delay childbearing, it causes a temporary baby bust in the economy, and
the echoes of the initial baby bust create long-lasting demographic cycles. We construct
an overlapping generations model where agents work for more than one period so that the
demographic cycles are translated into ﬂuctuations in the age structure of the labor force.
As the variation in the age composition of workers aﬀects the distribution of income among
diﬀerent cohorts (see Berger 1989), demographic cycles lead to cycles in the aggregate saving
rate, which drive ﬂuctuations in the capital–labor ratio. We will show that the ﬂuctuations in
the capital–labor ratio have diﬀerential welfare eﬀects on agents depending on their positions
in the demographic cycles. This point was not found by earlier studies. For instance, Iyigun
(2000) considered a small open economy with a ﬁxed capital–labor ratio, savings were not
allowed in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), and Mullin and Wang (2002) and d’Albis et al.
3For empirical studies on this issue, see Buckles (2008), which employed the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth to investigate the return to delayed childbearing in the US. Using Japanese panel data, Higuchi
(2001) investigated the eﬀects of labor market changes on the timing of marriage, childbirth, and employment.
4Iyigun (2000) built a growth model where women face a tradeoﬀ between childbearing and human
capital accumulation when young, and derived multiple steady state equilibria. Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002) illustrated the mechanism where an increase in longevity delays the timing of childbearing. Mullin
and Wang (2002) constructed an endogenous childbirth timing model where the solution is obtained as a
closed form. d’Albis et al. (2010) proved the existence of a monetary equilibrium in a model where the age
of childbearing is determined endogenously.
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(2010) assumed a linear technology where one unit of eﬀective labor produces a ﬁxed amount
of output. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
theoretical model. Section 3 analytically examines the impact of delayed childbearing on
capital accumulation and welfare. Section 4 numerically examines the general case where
only a fraction of agents delay their childbearing. Section 5 considers extensions of the model
with a lower lifetime fertility rate and technological progress. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Appendices A and B provide the proofs of the lemmas.
2 Model
2.1 Demographic Structure
Let us consider an overlapping generations model where each agent lives for four periods,
referred to as child, young, middle-aged, and old. A group of young agents in period t (i.e.,
those who are born in period t¡ 1) is called generation t, and its cohort size is denoted by
Nt. Each agent has one child during her lifetime (the gender of the agents is not considered),
and she is able to bear a child either in her youth or middle age. In this paper, we say that
an agent “delays childbearing” if she bears her (only) child in her middle age.
Let us denote by ¸t 2 [0; 1] the fraction of agents among generation-t agents who de-
lay childbearing. This means that among the generation-t agents with population Nt, the
fraction ¸t bear their children in their middle age (period t+ 1), and the remaining fraction
1¡¸t bear their children in their youth (period t). The cohort size of generation t+1, born
in period t, is thus determined by:
Nt+1 = (1¡ ¸t)Nt + ¸t¡1Nt¡1: (1)
To highlight the eﬀect of age distribution on capital accumulation and welfare as simply
as possible, the timing of childbearing is assumed to be exogenous throughout the analysis.5
5Doepke (2005) showed that the timing of childbirth is aﬀected by the child mortality rate in a sequential
fertility choice model. A decline in child mortality also reduces the uncertainty about the number of surviving
children, which lowers the fertility rate and raises educational investment, causing the demographic transition
(see Kalemli-Ozcan 2002, 2003; Tamura 2006).
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Figure 1: Fluctuations in Cohort Size Nt over Generations
We consider the situation where all agents until generation ¡1 bear their children when they
are young, and from generation 0 a constant fraction ¸ of agents bear their children when
they are middle-aged, i.e.:
¸t =
8<: 0; t < 0;¸; t ¸ 0: (2)
We normalize the cohort size so that N0 = 1 holds. As equations (1) and (2) imply
that the cohort size is constant until period 0, Nt = 1 holds for all t · 0. When delayed
childbearing begins, the period fertility rate temporarily falls. In period 0, only fraction 1¡¸
of generation-0 young agents bear children, while the generation-(¡1) middle-aged agents do
not bear children because they completed childbearing in the previous period (i.e., ¸¡1 = 0).
Thus, the cohort size of generation 1, who are born in period 0, is given by:
N1 = 1¡ ¸: (3)
From period 1 on, not only a fraction 1 ¡ ¸ of young agents, but also a fraction ¸ of
middle-aged agents bear children. Hence, the period fertility rate recovers to some extent,
which is consistent with Bongaarts and Feeney (1998). Substituting N0 = 1, N1 = 1¡¸, and
equation (2) into (1), the cohort size after generation 0 is solved as Nt =
1
1+¸
¡
1 + (¡1)t ¸t+1¢
for t ¸ 0. Figure 1 depicts the sequences of Nt for various levels of ¸. It shows that the
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Labor Force Lt
cohort size Nt ﬂuctuates after delayed childbearing begins (i.e., after period 0), and that the
amplitude of oscillation is larger when ¸ is higher. This indicates that the initial ﬂuctuation
of age structure (i.e., the fall in the fertility rate in period 0 and a recovery in period 1) has
recurrent “echo eﬀects” over many generations. If ¸ 2 (0; 1), the ﬂuctuation decays and Nt
converges to a stationary level at limt!1Nt = 1=(1 + ¸),6 although Nt ﬂuctuates forever in
the polar case of ¸ = 1.
2.2 Economic Environment
Agents undertake no economic activity in their childhood, supply one unit of labor inelasti-
cally in their youth and middle age, respectively, and retire when old. The total labor force
in period t is thus expressed as:
Lt = Nt +Nt¡1; (4)
which is depicted in Figure 2 for various levels of ¸. This ﬁgure shows that the delayed
childbearing decreases the labor force permanently even when the lifetime fertility rate is
6This is consistent with Lotka’s stable population theory, which states that in a closed economy where
there is no migration, a long-run age distribution becomes time invariant when age-speciﬁc fertility and
mortality rates are constant (see Keyﬁtz and Caswell 2005).
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held constant, and the level of Lt is lower when a larger fraction of agents decide to delay
childbearing (i.e., when ¸ is higher).7 Observe also that the labor force Lt has much smaller
oscillations than the cohort size Nt (in fact, there is no oscillation when ¸ = 1). We will
show that the ﬂuctuations in the age composition of the labor force, rather than in the size
of the labor force itself, drive the economic dynamics in this model.
There is a single ﬁnal good in each period that can be used for either consumption or
investment. Consumption takes place when agents are middle-aged and old.8 The utility of
a generation-t agent is given by:
Ut = log cm;t+1 + ¯ log co;t+2; (5)
where cm;t+1 and co;t+2 represent generation-t consumption in their middle age (period t+1)
and old age (period t+ 2), respectively.
Let wt and rt denote the wage rate and the gross interest rate (i.e., including the principal)
in period t. Then, the budget constraint of a generation-t agent is:
ay;t = wt; (6)
cm;t+1 + am;t+1 = wt+1 + rt+1ay;t; (7)
co;t+2 = rt+2am;t+1; (8)
where ay;t and am;t+1 denote the amounts of assets held by a generation-t agent when she is
young and middle-aged, respectively. Maximizing (5) subject to (6)-(8) yields:
cm;t+1 = (1¡ z) (rt+1wt + wt+1) ; (9)
am;t+1 = z (rt+1wt + wt+1) ; (10)
where z ´ ¯=(1 + ¯) denotes the propensity to save by the middle-aged, which is a key
parameter in the following analysis.
7UsingNt = 11+¸
³
1 + (¡1)t ¸t+1
´
, the total labor force is expressed as Lt = 11+¸
³
2 + (¡1)t¡1 ¸t (1¡ ¸)
´
for t ¸ 1. In period 0, it is given by 2¡¸. It can be shown analytically that Lt is a decreasing function with
respect to ¸ when 0 · ¸ · 1. Similarly, the total population, P2j=¡1Nt¡j , also decreases as ¸ increases.
8For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider consumption in childhood and youth as the main results are
not qualitatively aﬀected. We also ignore the utility from and the costs of having children. See, for example,
Tamura (2006) for the fertility decision through utility maximization.
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Observe that in period t, aggregate savings consist of the asset holdings of young agents,
ay;tNt, and the assets held by the middle-aged, am;tNt¡1. These aggregate savings, denoted
by St, become the capital stock in the next period. From (6) and (10), this means that the
capital stock in period t+ 1, denoted by Kt+1, is determined as:
Kt+1 = St = ay;tNt + am;tNt¡1 = wtNt + z(rtwt¡1 + wt)Nt¡1: (11)
Goods are produced competitively by a representative ﬁrm using labor and the capital
stock. The aggregate amount of production is given by a standard Cobb–Douglas production
function Yt = AK
®
t L
1¡®
t , where parameter A > 0 is total factor productivity, whereas pa-
rameter ® 2 (0; 1) represents the share of capital. The production function can be expressed
in terms of per-worker values as yt = Ak
®
t , where yt ´ Yt=Lt is output per worker and
kt ´ Kt=Lt is the capital–labor ratio. Denoting the capital depreciation rate by ± 2 [0; 1],
the proﬁt-maximizing condition for the ﬁrm implies that the factor prices in equilibrium are:
rt = A®k
®¡1
t + 1¡ ± ´ r (kt) ; (12)
wt = A (1¡ ®) k®t ´ w (kt) : (13)
Substituting these factor prices into (11) gives the evolution of per-worker capital over
generations:
kt+1 = A (1¡ ®)
Ntk
®
t + zNt¡1
£¡
A®k®¡1t + 1¡ ±
¢
k®t¡1 + k
®
t
¤
Nt+1 +Nt
; (14)
where we used the fact that kt+1 = Kt+1=Lt+1 = Kt+1=(Nt+1+Nt). Recalling that the timing
of childbirth ¸t for all t is given by (2), equation (1) and initial condition N0 = 1 determines
the demographic dynamics Nt for all t. Then, given the path of Nt and the initial two values
of capital, k0 and k¡1, (14) determines the dynamic path of the capital–labor ratio kt for all
t.
3 Dynamic Eﬀects of Delayed Childbearing
In the following, we investigate the dynamic eﬀects of delayed childbearing on capital accu-
mulation and welfare. Throughout this section, we focus on the polar case of ¸ = 1, where
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period ¡1 period 0 period 1 even periods odd periods
t = 2; 4; : : : t = 3; 5; : : :
Old 1 1 1 1 0
Middle-Aged (worker) 1 1 1 0 1
Young (worker) 1 1 0 1 0
Child 1 0 1 0 1
Table 1: Evolution of Demographic Structure when ¸ = 1. Numbers in italic indicate the
cohorts in the labor force
all agents beginning from generation 0 bear children in middle age. Although this case is
not very plausible, it allows us to analytically explain the eﬀect of delaying childbearing in
a simple way. We also assume full capital deprecation (± = 1) in this section. The general
case with ¸; ± 2 (0; 1) will be numerically investigated in the next section.
3.1 Equilibrium Path When All Agents Delay Childbearing (¸ =
1)
When ¸ = 1, the demographic dynamics (1) simplify to Nt+1 = Nt¡1 for all t ¸ 1. Substi-
tuting N0 = 1 and N1 = 0 from (3) into this equation, it turns out that Nt = 1 for all even t
and Nt = 0 for all odd t. Table 1 describes the implied demographic structure at each point
in time. Note that the whole labor force consists only of young workers in even periods, and
only of middle-aged workers in odd periods.9
With the path of Nt, we can derive the equilibrium path of the capital–labor ratio kt,
given the initial k0 and k¡1 values. Substituting N0 = N¡1 = 1 and N1 = 0 into (14) for
9Of course, this is an extreme possibility: young and middle-aged workers would coexist if ¸ 2 (0; 1).
However, the important point is that the composition of young and middle-aged workers in the labor force
ﬂuctuates, which is still true for ¸ 2 (0; 1). Observe from the demographic dynamics illustrated by Figure
1 that the young workers are the majority (i.e., Nt > Nt¡1) in the even periods, whereas the middle-aged
workers are the majority (i.e., Nt < Nt¡1) in the odd periods.
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t = 0, we obtain the capital–labor ratio in period 1:10
k1 = A(1¡ ®)
£
(1 + z)k®0 + zA®k
®¡1
0 k
®
¡1
¤
: (15)
For k2 and onwards, substituting fN0; N1; N2; N3; ¢ ¢ ¢ g = f1; 0; 1; 0; ¢ ¢ ¢ g into (14) gives:
for t ¸ 1; kt+1 =
8<: A (1¡ ®) k®t if t is even;A (1¡ ®) z ©k®t + A®k®t¡1k®¡1t ª if t is odd: (16)
This pattern of dynamics can be intuitively interpreted in terms of the aggregate saving
rate (adjusted for labor force growth), deﬁned by:
vt ´ St
Yt
Á
Lt+1
Lt
=
Kt+1=Lt+1
Yt=Lt
=
kt+1
Ak®t
: (17)
As labor force Lt is constant at 1 for all t ¸ 1 (see Figure 2),11 vt simply represents the
aggregate saving rate for t ¸ 1.
Using this deﬁnition, the ﬁrst line of equation (16) can be restated as vt = 1¡®. In even
periods, young agents are the sole workers, and thus they earn the labor share of output,
(1 ¡ ®)Yt. At the same time, they are also the sole savers in even periods, and because
they save their income entirely, aggregate savings coincide with their income, (1 ¡ ®)Yt.
Therefore, in even periods, the aggregate saving rate vt is determined by the labor share of
the production, 1¡ ®.
For odd periods, the second line of equation (16) can be restated as vt = (1¡ ®) z (1 + ®=vt¡1).
Note that vt¡1 in this equation refers to the aggregate saving rate in even periods, which is
1¡ ® as shown above. By substituting vt¡1 = 1¡ ® into the above equation, it simpliﬁes to
vt = z. In odd periods (t ¸ 3), the middle-aged are the only workers. In addition, the capital
used in odd periods is owned solely by the middle-aged, because they are the only savers in
the previous period (when they were young in even periods). Therefore, they earn the entire
output Yt. The middle-aged are the sole savers in odd periods, and they save fraction z of
10Recall also that we have assumed ± = 1 for this section.
11When ¸ 2 (0; 1), labor force Lt does ﬂuctuate in transition dynamics. However, comparing Figure 2 and
Figure 1 shows that the ﬂuctuations in labor force Lt are much smaller than in the demographic dynamics
of Nt.
10
their income. Therefore, the aggregate saving rate vt coincides with their saving propensity,
z.
To summarize, the aggregate saving rate vt exhibits a two-period cycle after period 2:
12
for t ¸ 2, vt =
8<: 1¡ ® if t is even;z if t is odd: (18)
Note that either the saving rate in even periods 1 ¡ ®, or that in odd periods z, could be
larger. On one hand, young workers have a high saving propensity (unity), but they save
only out of labor income (wt). On the other hand, middle-aged workers earn both labor and
capital income (wt + rtwt¡1), but their saving propensity is lower (z < 1).13
Using the values of vt in (18), we can derive the sequence of kt. Note that (17) implies
a simple relationship between the aggregate saving rate vt and the evolution of the capital–
labor ratio kt:
kt+1 = vtAk
®
t : (19)
Taking the logs of (19) and applying this recursively, we obtain:
log kt =
Ã
t¡3X
j=0
®j
!
logA+
Ã
t¡3X
j=0
®jvt¡1¡j
!
+ ®t¡2 log k2 for t ¸ 3; (20)
where k2 = A(1¡ ®)z
©
k®1 + A®k
®
0 k
®¡1
1
ª
from (16), k1 is given by (15), and k0 (and k¡1) is
given as the initial value. This equilibrium path has the following property.
12There is no cycle in the knife-edge case of 1¡® = z. For completeness, v0 is obtained by v0 = k1= (Ak®0 ),
where k0 is a part of the initial condition and k1 is given by (16). The level of v1 is then obtained by
v1 = (1¡ ®) z (1 + ®=v0) :
13From the Family Income and Expenditure Survey for wage-earning households with two or more persons
in Japan, we conﬁrmed that the average saving rate (1¡ the average propensity to consume) tends to fall
with the age of the household head, from 32.0% (thirties) to 28.8% (forties) to 25.4% (ﬁfties) and then to
11.3% (sixties) using 2000–2010 data. While some other reports ﬁnd ﬂat or rising age-saving proﬁles (even
after the retirement age), Jappelli and Modigliani (2005) pointed out that these are because contributions
to pension funds (including employers’ contribution) are not regarded as savings, and also because pension
incomes are treated as income although they should be regarded as dissavings. They estimated the eﬀects
of social security on the age-saving proﬁle in Italy, which showed that actual savings are highest when the
household head is in his/her late thirties and then falls to zero around age 60.
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Proposition 1 (Limit cycles when all agents delay childbearing):
In the equilibrium with ¸ = 1, fktg1t=0 converges to a two-period limit cycle regardless of the
initial values. Deﬁne k¤even ´ lims!+1 k2s and k¤odd ´ lims!+1 k2s+1, where s is an integer.
Depending on z ´ ¯=(1 + ¯), the relative magnitude of k¤even and k¤odd is:
(Case I) if z < 1¡ ®, k¤even < k¤odd holds.
(Case II) if z > 1¡ ®, k¤even > k¤odd holds.14
Proof: As t ! 1, the ﬁrst term of (20) converges to (1 ¡ ®)¡1 logA, whereas the
third term vanishes because ® 2 (0; 1). When t is even (i.e., when t = 2s for some integer s),
from (18), the second term is expanded as log z+® log(1¡®)+®3 log z+®4 log(1¡®)+ ¢ ¢ ¢ ;
which converges to (1¡ ®)¡1 log Veven(z), where:
Veven(z) ´ [(1¡ ®)® z]
1
1+® (21)
is a geometric weighted average of the aggregate saving rate vt.
15 Similarly, when t is odd
(i.e., when t = 2s+1), the second term is expanded as log(1¡®) +® log z+®3 log(1¡®) +
®4 log z + ¢ ¢ ¢ ; which converges to (1¡ ®)¡1 log Vodd(z), where:
Vodd(z) ´ [(1¡ ®) z®]
1
1+® : (22)
From these, we conclude that the values of kt in even and odd periods, respectively, converge
to:
lim
s!1
log k2s = log k
¤
even =
1
1¡ ® [log Veven(z) + logA] ; (23)
lim
s!1
log k2s+1 = log k
¤
odd =
1
1¡ ® [log Vodd(z) + logA] : (24)
Note that Veven(z) < Vodd(z) holds if z < 1 ¡ ® (Case I), whereas the opposite holds if
z > 1¡ ® (Case II). Therefore, k¤even < k¤odd holds if and only if z < 1¡ ®. ¥
14Although the condition for Case II (z > 1¡ ®) might seem unlikely to hold, this is only because of the
simplifying assumption of complete capital depreciation (± = 1). In Section 4, we show that a lower ± makes
Case II more likely, and it is shown that both cases happen within a reasonable parameter range (see also
footnote 24).
15Observe that Veven(z) in (21) puts a higher weight on z than on (1 ¡ ®) because in even periods the
most recent aggregate saving rate is v2s¡1 = z. Similarly, Vodd(z) in (22) puts a higher weight on (1¡ ®).
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Figure 3: Limit Cycles in kt with Alternating Aggregate Saving Rate vt
Proposition 1 states that if all agents from period 0 delay childbearing, the capital–labor
ratio kt eventually converges to a two-period limit cycle. This ﬂuctuation is driven not by
the size of the labor force (which is constant), but by the age distribution within it, through
the ﬂuctuations in the aggregate saving rate vt. Figure 3 illustrates the limit cycles for the
two cases, where the two loci are drawn by substituting 1 ¡ ® (even periods) and z (odd
periods) for vt in the capital accumulation equation (19). Panel (i) shows that in Case I
(z < 1 ¡ ®), the aggregate saving rate is higher in even periods, which results in a higher
capital stock in odd periods. Conversely, panel (ii) depicts that the higher saving rate in
odd periods results in the higher capital stock in even periods in Case II (z > 1¡ ®).
3.2 Eﬀects on Capital Accumulation
As we have seen in Figure 2, delayed childbearing lowers the labor force permanently. This
subsection examines how this aﬀects capital accumulation in the economy by comparing the
capital–labor ratio in the limit cycles to the economy without delayed childbearing.
Note that without delayed childbearing (i.e., when ¸ = 0), Nt = 1 holds for all t from
(1) and the initial condition N0 = 1. By substituting Nt¡1 = Nt = Nt+1 = 1 and ± =
1 into the capital accumulation equation (14), and rewriting the resulting equation using
vt ´ kt+1=(Ak®t ), we obtain the evolution of the aggregate saving rate vt for the case of
13
¸ = 0. From it, we ﬁnd that the steady state level of vt is a (positive) solution to a quadratic
equation » (v) ´ 2v2 ¡ (1¡ ®) (1 + z) v ¡ ® (1¡ ®) z = 0; which we obtain as:
v¤(z) ´ 1
4
½
(1¡ ®) (1 + z) +
q
(1¡ ®)2 (1 + z)2 + 8® (1¡ ®) z
¾
: (25)
As (20) holds for any ¸, we obtain the steady state capital–labor ratio k¤ for ¸ = 0 by
substituting (25) into (20):
log k¤ =
1
1¡ ® [log v
¤(z) + logA] : (26)
It is apparent from (23), (24) and (26) that the relative magnitudes of the capital–
labor ratios, k¤odd, k
¤
even, and k
¤, can be obtained by comparing Vodd(z), Veven(z), and v¤(z).
To focus on the relevant situation, we assume that the share of capital is not too high:
® <
¡p
5¡ 1¢ =2 ¼ 0:618. With this assumption, we can show the following property.
Lemma 1 (Comparison of Vodd(z) and Veven(z) to v
¤(z)):
(i) At z = 1¡ ®, Vodd(z) = Veven(z) = v¤(z) = 1¡ ® holds.
(ii) There exist bz 2 (0; 1¡ ®) such that Vodd(bz) = v¤(bz) holds. Vodd(z) > v¤(z) holds if and
only if z 2 (bz; 1¡ ®).
(iii) Veven(z) > v
¤(z) holds if and only if z > 1¡ ®.
Proof: Property (i) is immediately conﬁrmed by comparing (21), (22), and (25) at
z = 1¡ ®. The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are given in Appendix A. ¥
As summarized in Table 2, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 imply three possibilities regarding
the relative magnitudes of k¤odd, k
¤
even, and k
¤:16
Proposition 2 (Comparison of capital–labor ratios between the limit cycle at
¸ = 1 and the steady state at ¸ = 0):
(Case Ia) If z < (0; bz), k¤even < k¤odd < k¤ holds.
(Case Ib) If z < (bz; 1¡ ®), k¤even < k¤ < k¤odd holds.
(Case II) If z > 1¡ ®, k¤odd <k¤ < k¤even holds.
16It can also be shown that if z = 1¡® (i.e., when capital does not ﬂuctuate), k¤even = k¤odd = k¤ holds. In
addition, if z = bz, k¤even < k¤odd = k¤ holds. We ignore these border cases because they do not occur except
for a (measure 0) coincidence.
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Case I: k¤
even
< k¤
odd
Case II: k¤
even
< k¤
k¤
odd
< k¤ k¤ < k¤
odd
k¤
odd
< k¤
k
¤
even < k
¤
k
¤
< k
¤
even
Case Ia: k¤even < k
¤
odd
< k¤ Case Ib: k¤even < k
¤ < k¤
odd
Case II: k¤
odd
< k¤ < k¤even
bz 1¡ ® z
k¤even = k
¤
odd
= k¤
odd
Table 2: Derivation of Proposition 2 (shown in the bottom row). The ﬁrst row is from
Proposition 1. The second and third rows are from Lemma 1(ii) and (iii).
Observe that the lower end of the limit cycle (minfk¤odd; k¤eveng) is always smaller than
the steady state level k¤ in the economy without delayed childbearing (which we call the
benchmark economy). In addition, if z is suﬃciently small (z < bz), the upper end of the
limit cycle can also be smaller than k¤. This means that the long-term levels of the capital–
labor ratio kt in the delayed childbearing economy are always smaller than the steady state
capital–labor ratio k¤ in the benchmark economy. This might seem paradoxical, given that in
the delayed childbearing economy, the labor force remains low compared with the benchmark
economy (compare ¸ = 1 to ¸ = 0 in Figure 2). This paradoxical result can be explained
by the alternating age composition in the labor force. Recall from (18) that the aggregate
saving rate alternates between 1¡® and z. In Case Ia, the saving propensity of the middle-
aged agents, z ´ ¯=(1 + ¯), is small. Thus, in odd periods, when the labor force is entirely
composed of middle-aged agents, the aggregate saving rate vt = z is low. This makes capital
per worker in the next period (k¤even) considerably smaller than in the benchmark (k
¤), and
therefore also the wage rate. As a result, workers in even periods, who are composed of
young agents, receive substantially lower incomes than in the benchmark economy. Thus,
even though the aggregate saving rate in even periods vt = 1¡ ® is higher than that in the
benchmark economy (v¤(z)), the amount of aggregate savings can be lower, which explains
the possibility of k¤even < k
¤
odd < k
¤.17
17One may then wonder why k¤ < k¤odd < k
¤
even never occurs in Case II. As we assumed ® to be lower than
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3.3 Welfare Eﬀects
We now examine how the cycles in the capital–labor ratio in the delayed childbearing econ-
omy aﬀect the welfare of agents. Note that, by substituting (8), (9), and (10) into (5), the
utility of generation-t agents (those who are born in period t¡ 1) is written as:
Ut = ¯ log z + log(1¡ z) + (1 + ¯) log (rt+1wt + wt+1) + ¯ log rt+2: (27)
Let us call those agents born in odd periods and thus young in even periods the “even-
period generations.” In the delayed childbearing economy (¸ = 1), the whole population is
composed only of the even-period generations (Nt = 0 for all odd t). Therefore, the long-
term welfare of agents in the limit cycle can be measured by U¤even ´ lims!+1 U2s. Using
the limit-cycle values of the capital–labor ratio, we can write long-term welfare with ¸ = 1
as:
U¤even = (1 + ¯) log[A® (k
¤
odd)
®¡1 (k¤even)
® + (k¤odd)
®]¡ ¯ (1¡ ®) log k¤even + C; (28)
where C is a constant term deﬁned as C ´ ¯ log ¯ ¡ (1 + ¯) log(1 + ¯) + ¯ logA® + (1 +
¯) logA (1¡ ®). Similarly, long-term welfare in the benchmark economy (¸ = 0) can be
written as:
U¤ = (1 + ¯) log[A® (k¤)2®¡1 + (k¤)®]¡ ¯ (1¡ ®) log k¤ + C: (29)
Comparing (28) with (29), we have the following property.
Lemma 2 (Diﬀerence between U¤even and U
¤):
(i) U¤even is lower than U
¤ if and only if Ω(z) < 0, where function Ω(z) is deﬁned by:
Ω (z) ´ ¡ log (1¡ ®)
·
®
v¤ (z)
+ 1
¸
¡ ®
1¡ ® log
v¤ (z)
Vodd (z)
+ z log
v¤ (z)
Veven (z)
: (30)
(ii) limz!0Ω (z) = ¡1 and Ω(1¡ ®) = 0 hold.
¡p
5¡ 1¢ =2, the wage equation wt = A(1¡ ®)k®t has a certain degree of concavity with respect to kt. This
concavity implies that, while a negative deviation k¤even from k
¤ in Case I results in a substantial drop in
the wage income, a positive deviation of k¤even from k¤ in Case II results in a relatively small wage increase.
Therefore, k¤odd does not exceed k
¤ in Case II.
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Proof: Given in Appendix B. ¥
As function Ω(z) is continuous, Lemma 2 implies that when z is suﬃciently close to 0,
Ω(z) must be negative, and hence U¤even < U
¤ holds. The next proposition states this result.
Proposition 3 (Welfare comparison between ¸ = 1 and ¸ = 0):
There exists a value ez 2 (0; 1¡ ®] such that U¤even < U¤ holds whenever z < ez.
As long as the saving propensity of the middle-aged, z ´ ¯=(1 + ¯), is suﬃciently small,
or equivalently when the agents discount the future signiﬁcantly (i.e., ¯ is small), the delayed
childbearing (¸ = 1) causes the long-run welfare of agents to fall compared with the case
where delayed childbearing does not occur (¸ = 0). This again seems paradoxical, because
when the population falls from the initial level, it is usually anticipated that each agent
enjoys a higher per-worker capital and hence higher consumption. This does not hold true
in this case, similar to the discussion in the previous subsection, because of the ﬂuctuations
in the age composition of workers.
4 Numerical Analysis
This section considers a general case where only a fraction of agents delay childbearing.
When ¸ 2 (0; 1), the ﬂuctuations in Nt gradually settle to a long-term value (see Figure 1).
Nonetheless, the ﬂuctuations inNt continue for an extended number of generations, especially
when ¸ is relatively large.18 This section examines their eﬀects on capital accumulation and
welfare in the transitional dynamics. We also relax the assumption of complete capital
depreciation.
4.1 Equilibrium Dynamics under ¸ 2 (0; 1)
For a given value of ¸, the path of Nt is readily calculated as depicted in Figure 1 using
(1) and (2) along with initial condition N0 = 1. As Nt = 1 for all t · 0, we reasonably
assume that the economy has reached the steady state under Nt = 1 by period ¡1, and also
18For example, if 80% of agents delay childbearing (¸ = 0:8), it can be seen that substantial ﬂuctuations
in Nt remain even after 10 generations (around 200 years).
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remains at the same steady state at period 0.19 We previously calculated this steady state
in Subsection 3.2 as the benchmark case, where the steady state level of the capital–labor
ratio k¤ is given by (26). Thus, we use k¡1 = k¡0 = k¤ as the initial condition to calculate
the path of kt using (14).
We specify the parameters as follows. As an agent lives for four periods, one period in the
model can be considered as approximately 20 years. If agents discount future consumption
by 1% per quarter, as is often assumed in the literature, the discount factor ¯ will be
(1+0:01)¡4£20 ¼ 0:45. Therefore, we take ¯ = 0:45 as the reference value, and also examine
the low-beta (¯ = 0:1) and the high-beta (¯ = 0:9) cases. For the depreciation parameter ±,
Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated a yearly depreciation rate for the physical capital stock
of 5.9%, and 1.2% for the R&D capital stock. The capital stock Kt in our model includes
both physical and R&D capital stocks, but these estimates suggest that a good fraction of
the aggregate capital stock that remains after 20 years would be R&D capital. Therefore we
use a yearly depreciation rate of 2% as a reference (which means ± = 0:33 for a period of 20
years), and also examine the case of a higher depreciation rate of 5% per year (± = 0:64).
The share of capital ® is set to 0.4.20
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium paths of kt for ¯ = 0.1, 0.45, and 0.9, respectively, and
also for ± = 0:33 and 0.64. Each panel depicts 10 paths of kt, where each path corresponds
to the cases of ¸ = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, and 1. In period 1, the labor force falls from 2 to 2¡ ¸
because fraction ¸ of parents in the previous period decided to delay childbearing, and hence
there are only 1¡¸ young workers in this period. Note also that the aggregate capital stock
is the same as in the initial steady state, because it is determined by the aggregate savings
in the previous period.21 Therefore, the initial response of the capital–labor ratio is always
19Note that, even though ¸t jumps up from 0 to ¸ > 0 in period 0, the population is not immediately
aﬀected, nor is the capital–labor ratio, because the fertility in period 0 determines the amount of labor
supplied in period 1 and beyond.
20As we do not distinguish between physical and human capital, the share of Kt, ®, should be higher than
the conventionally measured share of physical capital. Thus, we choose ® = 0:4, although the value of ®
does not substantially change the pattern of the dynamics. The scaling parameter A is set to 1.5. Under
these parameter values, we conﬁrmed that dynamic eﬃciency rt > 1 is always satisﬁed at the steady state.
21This result depends on the logarithmic period utility function, which implies that the savings of agents
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Figure 4: Evolution of Capital–Labor Ratio kt
positive, and k1 = (2=(2¡ ¸)) k¤ is higher when ¸ is higher.
Observe from Figure 2 that the labor force falls further in period 2 (except for the case
of ¸ = 1, where Lt falls to the bottom only in one period). At the same time, however, the
aggregate capital stock is also lower than the initial steady state, because there were fewer
young workers in the previous period (N1 = 1 ¡ ¸) who contributed to aggregate savings.
Figure 4 shows that the second eﬀect dominates, and the size of the fall in kt at t = 2 is
do not depend on the interest rate. If the agents are more risk averse (i.e., if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is lower than unity), the middle-aged agents in period 0 would somewhat increase savings,
because they know that the interest rate in period 1 will be lower because of the reduced labor supply, and
would want to supplement old-age consumption by saving more. Therefore, the magnitude of the initial
ﬂuctuations will be larger than shown in this paper.
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larger when ¸ is larger. In addition, when ¯ is small (i.e., when the saving propensity of the
middle-aged z = ¯=(1 + ¯) is small), the major portion of the aggregate savings depends on
the savings by the young workers. Therefore, with large ¸ and small ¯, the fall in aggregate
savings in t = 2 is so large that k2 falls below (or “overshoots”) the initial capital–labor ratio
k¤.22
The pattern of dynamics after period 3 depends both on ¸ and ¯. When only a small
fraction of parents delay childbearing, the ﬂuctuations in cohort size Nt disappear in a
relatively short period of time. Therefore, with small ¸, kt settles to the steady state value
k¤ relatively quickly, without cycles. If ¸ is relatively large, two-period cycles in kt are
present, which last for many generations. The pattern of the cycles is comparable to the
results we obtained in Proposition 2. Figure 4(i) shows that when ¯ is small, the capital–
labor ratio kt is smaller in even periods than in odd periods, which corresponds to Case I
(a and b) in Proposition 2. In particular, the values of kt in even periods are far below the
steady state value k¤, whereas in odd periods they are barely above k¤ (except for the case
of ¸ = 1, where kt in odd periods is also smaller than k
¤, as we mentioned in Case Ia in
Proposition 2). This asymmetry can be understood in terms of the reason why both k¤even
and k¤odd can be lower than k
¤ when z is small, which we discussed in Subsection 3.2.
Figure 4(iii) shows that the pattern of the cycle is opposite when ¯ is large. The capital–
labor ratio is larger in even periods than in odd periods, similar to Case II in Proposition
2. When ¯ is at an intermediate value (¯ = 0:45), Figure 4(ii) suggests that the pattern is
similar to Case I if ¸ is large, whereas it is similar to Case II if ¸ is intermediate (and no
cycle if ¸ is small). Finally, Figure 4(iv) illustrates that a higher ± shifts the entire path of
the capital–labor ratio kt downwards, but the eﬀect of ± on the pattern of the ﬂuctuations
is not clear from this ﬁgure.
To show the dependence of the pattern of cycles on parameter values more explicitly,
we experimented with 40000 combinations of ¸ and ¯ by varying each of them from 0.005
to 1.00 in 200 steps, and we repeated this for two values of ±. We calculated the dynamic
path of kt for each combination of parameters until period 10, and then classiﬁed the result
22In Figure 4, it can be observed that k2 < k¤ occurs when ¯ = 0:1 and ¸ ¸ 0:6, and also when ¯ = 0:45
and ¸ ¸ 0:9.
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Figure 5: Pattern of Cycles in kt
according to the pattern of movements, based on that in Proposition 2. The phase diagrams
depicted in Figure 5 summarize the result. When the combination of ¸ and ¯ belongs to
the area labeled as Case Ib, we ﬁnd [kt in even periods] < k
¤ < [kt in odd periods] holds for
all t > 3, whereas we ﬁnd [kt in even periods] < [kt in odd periods] < k
¤ in the small area
labeled as Case Ia.23 Similarly, in the area labeled as Case II, [kt in odd periods] < k
¤ < [kt
in even periods] holds. In the area “No cycle,” kt > k
¤ holds for all t > 3. The remaining
white areas correspond to the border cases where the movements of kt do not ﬁt exactly
any of the above patterns (e.g., when cycles are present until a certain period but disappear
before period t = 10).
Figure 5 conﬁrms that cycles in the capital–labor ratio emerge when a certain fraction
23As explained in the text, we classify the pattern of the dynamics according to the level of kt relative to
the steady state value k¤. An alternative method of classiﬁcation is to focus on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
capital–labor ratio, kt ¡ kt¡1, and examine if it is greater (or less) than zero. This calculation shows that
the resulting phase diagram is almost identical to Figure 5. The sign of kt ¡ kt¡1 is positive only in odd
periods in the area labeled as Case Ia and Ib, and the opposite holds in Case II. The sign of kt ¡ kt¡1 is
negative for all t > 3 in the “No cycle” area because kt monotonically falls to the steady state level.
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(around 0.4) of agents delay childbearing. When cycles emerge, the capital–labor ratio is
higher in odd periods if the discount factor ¯ (or equivalently the propensity to save z) is
small, and vice versa. Observe also that the border between Case Ib and Case II bends
toward the right as ¸ increases. Thus, for a given intermediate ¯, the pattern of cycles can
be reversed depending on the fraction of agents who delay childbearing (¸). In addition,
comparing panels (i) and (ii) in Figure 5 shows that a higher depreciation rate ± shifts
the border to the right. Intuitively, when ± is higher, the gross interest rate falls, which
reduces the income of the middle-aged agents. This lowers aggregate savings in odd periods
(when the middle-aged workers are the majority in the labor force), and in turn reduces the
capital stock in even periods, making Case Ib more likely.24 Finally, observe that Case Ia is
obtained under a reasonable depreciation rate, although it occurs only when ¯ is very small
(i.e., when agents discount the future quite signiﬁcantly) and ¸ is close to one (i.e., when
almost everyone delays childbearing).
4.2 Welfare Analysis under ¸ 2 (0; 1)
While we examined Ut only for even-period generations in Subsection 3.3, here we examine
Ut for both even- and odd-period generations because ¸ 2 (0; 1) implies that Nt > 0 for all
generations t. By substituting the path of kt into (12) and (13), we obtain factor prices, rt
and wt, on the equilibrium path. Then, substituting these into (27) gives the welfare Ut for
all generations. Similar to Figure 5, we calculated 80000 paths of Ut by varying ¯, ¸, and
±, and classiﬁed the pattern of evolution of Ut according to when Ut is above (or below) the
welfare of agents in the initial steady state, U¤, as given by (29). Figure 6 shows that the
resulting phase diagrams are basically similar to Figure 5.25
24 In Proposition 2, we have shown that the border between Cases Ib and Case II is at z = 1 ¡ ®, given
¸ = 1 and ± = 1. As z ´ ¯=(1 + ¯), this implies that the border would be at ¯ = (1¡ ®)=®, which is 1.5 if
® = 0:4. Therefore, it is almost impossible to obtain Case II under the assumption of ¸ = 1 and ± = 1 (see
footnote 14). However, the discussion in the text suggests that this is only because the highest combination
of ¸ and ± pushes the border too far away in the direction of the higher ¯. Under realistic values of ±, Figure
5 shows that both Case I and Case II are possible with a plausible range of ¯.
25Strictly speaking, there is a slight diﬀerence in the upper-right corner of Figure 6(ii), where the pattern
becomes ambiguous. Note that ¯ is close to 1 in this region, which means that the agents do not care about
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Figure 6: Pattern of Cycles in Ut
Types of income wage at young interest at middle wage at middle interest at old
Odd-period generations higher wt higher rt+1 lower wt+1 lower rt+2
(smaller population) (* kt > k¤) (* kt+1 < k¤) (* kt+1 < k¤) (* kt+2 > k¤)
Even-period generations lower wt lower rt+1 higher wt+1 higher rt+2
(larger population) (* kt < k¤) (* kt+1 > k¤) (* kt+1 > k¤) (* kt+2 < k¤)
Table 3: Eﬀects of Delayed Childbearing on Income Proﬁle (Case I)
Types of income wage at young interest at middle wage at middle interest at old
Odd-period generations lower wt lower rt+1 higher wt+1 higher rt+2
(smaller population) (* kt < k¤) (* kt+1 > k¤) (* kt+1 > k¤) (* kt+2 < k¤)
Even-period generations higher wt higher rt+1 lower wt+1 lower rt+2
(larger population) (* kt > k¤) (* kt+1 < k¤) (* kt+1 < k¤) (* kt+2 > k¤)
Table 4: Eﬀects of Delayed Childbearing on Income Proﬁle (Case II)
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It is intuitive that when kt converges monotonically to k
¤, the welfare of generations Ut
also converges to the steady state value U¤. Therefore, the region of “No cycle” in Figure
5 naturally corresponds to the same region in Figure 6. The correspondence of the other
regions can be understood in terms of the incomes that agents earn throughout their lives.
Consider the case where the combination of ¯ and ¸ belongs to the “Case Ib” region of
Figure 5. This means that, after the initial response, the capital–labor ratio kt is higher
than the steady state value k¤ in odd periods, whereas kt < k¤ in even periods. This pattern
of movement in kt aﬀects the income proﬁles of agents diﬀerently depending on whether they
belong to odd- or even-period generations. The odd-period generations (i.e., those who are
young in an odd period t) enjoy high wage incomes in their youth because kt > k
¤, and also
high interest incomes in their middle age because kt+1 < k
¤. Although they suﬀer from low
wage incomes in their middle age (because kt+1 < k
¤) and low interest incomes in their old
age (because kt+2 > k
¤), the high incomes in the earlier part of their life aﬀect their welfare
more signiﬁcantly because of discounting, and hence Ut tends to be higher than the steady
state level, U¤. On the contrary, as summarized by the bottom row in Table 3, even-period
generations (i.e., those who are young in an even period) lose income in the earlier part of
their lives. Thus, their lifetime welfare Ut tends to be lower than U
¤. As a result, [the welfare
of the even-period generations] < U¤ < [the welfare of odd-period generations] holds in the
region labeled “Case I” in Figure 6.
Recall from Figure 2 that even-period generations have larger cohort sizes than odd-
period generations, and the diﬀerence is more signiﬁcant when ¸ is higher. Therefore, the
result in Table 3 suggests that the majority of agents in the economy suﬀer from welfare loss
when the economy lies in Case I (i.e., when ¯, or equivalently z, is small). This can be viewed
as a generalized result of Proposition 3, which has shown that the welfare of all agents falls
if z is suﬃciently small in the case where only even-period generations exist (¸ = 1).
When ¯ and ¸ belong to “Case II”, the eﬀect of delayed childbearing on the incomes of
the odd- and even-period generations, respectively, are summarized in Table 4. In this case,
the timing of consumption. We guess that this is one reason why cycles in Ut are less evident in this region
(see Tables 3 and 4). Another slight diﬀerence is that there is no “Case Ia” region in Figure 6(i), while there
was a small region of “Case Ia” in Figure 5(i).
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(i) Size of cohorts over generations Nt (ii) Capital–labor ratio kt (¯ = 0:45, ± = 0:33)
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Figure 7: Demographic and Equilibrium Dynamics under Declining Population (n = 0:8)
Ut < U
¤ holds for odd-period generations and Ut > U¤ for even-period generations. This
implies that the majority of the population will beneﬁt from delayed childbearing, while
those born in-between the big cohorts experience a fall in their lifetime utility.
5 Extensions and Robustness
5.1 Declining Population
Prior to the previous section, we examined the eﬀect of delayed childbearing by assuming
that each agent has exactly one child in her lifetime. This is equivalent to assuming that the
lifetime fertility rate (LFR) is exactly at the replacement level. However, in most developed
countries where delayed childbirth is observed, the lifetime fertility rate is far below the
replacement level (with a possible exception of the United States, where the LFR is around
the replacement level). This means that the population is declining in the long run, even
without delayed childbearing. Here, we brieﬂy examine the eﬀect of delayed childbearing in
the economy where each agent has, on average, less than one child in her lifetime.
Suppose that each agent has, on average, n 2 (0; 1) children in her lifetime, and also that
the number of children does not correlate with the timing of childbearing. Recall that the
fraction ¸t of the generation-t agents delay childbearing. This means that from generation-t
25
agents with population Nt, n(1¡ ¸t)Nt children are born in period t (i.e., when parents are
young), and n¸tNt children are born in period t + 1 (i.e., when parents are middle-aged).
The cohort size of generation t+ 1, born in period t, is thus determined by:
Nt+1 = n (1¡ ¸t)Nt + n¸t¡1Nt¡1: (31)
Combining (31) with (2), we obtain the pattern of evolution of Nt.
26 Figure 7(i) depicts
the path of Nt for the case of n = 0:8, which roughly corresponds to the lifetime fertility rate
of 1.68 = 2:1(replacement rate)£ 0:8. When ¸ > 0, the initial fall in the cohort population
(N1 = n(1 ¡ ¸) < N0 = 1) is more signiﬁcant than the benchmark case (¸ = 0), not only
because each agent has fewer children in their life, but also because a fraction ¸ of young
agents in period 0 postpone childbearing until the next period. However, in the long run,
the delay of motherhood slows the pace of depopulation compared with the case of ¸ = 0.
As a result, for larger t, the population is actually higher when a larger fraction of agents
delay childbearing.
In a similar way to that in Subsection 4.1, substituting the path of Nt into (14) gives the
equilibrium dynamics for kt, as shown by Figure 7(ii). When compared with Figure 4(ii),
we observe that, although the pattern of the ﬂuctuations are similar, the long-run capital–
labor ratio kt is lower than in the initial steady state, and the diﬀerence is larger when ¸ is
higher. Intuitively, delayed childbearing in this economy (with n < 1) raises the long-run
rate of population growth, which naturally leads to a lower capital–labor ratio through a
capital-dilution eﬀect.27
As the capital-dilution eﬀect has already been well studied, we examine whether there
are cycles in the paths of kt and Ut after removing this eﬀect.
28 The results are shown in
26With the initial condition of N0 = 1 and N1 = n(1 ¡ ¸), equation Nt+1 = n (1¡ ¸)Nt + n¸Nt¡1
for t ¸ 1 can be solved as Nt = c1¾t1 + c2¾t2, where ¾1 = (n=2)
n
1¡ ¸+p(1¡ ¸)2 + (4¸=n)o > n and
¾2 = n(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¾1 < 0, given ¸; n 2 (0; 1). As j¾2j < j¾1j < 1, the evolution of Nt in the long run
is dominated by the c1¾t1 term, which means that delayed childbearing increases the long-term rate of
population growth from n to ¾1 > n.
27See Blanchet (1988) and Brander and Dowrick (1994) for more discussion on the capital-dilution eﬀect
by demographic growth.
28Using the long-term rate of population growth with delayed childbearing ¾1 =
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Figure 8: Pattern of Cycles with Declining Population (n = 0:8; ± = 0:33)
Figure 8. By comparing Figure 8(i) with Figure 5(i), we observe that the border between
Case Ib and Case II shifts to the left because of a lower n. In addition to the eﬀect of overall
population decline, a lower n also has an eﬀect on the composition of the labor force: if
agents have fewer children, the fraction of younger workers ceteris paribus will fall compared
with older (middle-aged) workers. This increases the aggregate savings in odd periods (when
the middle-aged workers are the majority in the labor force), and in turn raises the capital
stock in even periods, making Case II more likely.
The pattern of cycles in Ut, shown in Figure 6(ii), generally matches the pattern in kt,
although in the upper-right corner we ﬁnd that the welfare is higher than the long-term level
both for the odd- and even-period generations, at least until t = 10. However, note that this
gain in welfare exists only after controlling for the capital-dilution eﬀect. The overall eﬀect
of delayed childbearing on the capital–labor ratio and welfare is certainly more negative than
(n=2)
n
1¡ ¸+p(1¡ ¸)2 + (4¸=n)o, we calculate the long-term levels of kt and Ut, which depend
on ¸ because of the capital-dilution eﬀect (see footnote 26). Then, we examine if there are cycles in the
paths of kt (and Ut) relative to their respective long-term levels.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Dynamics with Technological Progress (° = 1:49, ¯ = 0:45, ± = 0:33)
analyzed in the previous section because of the capital-dilution eﬀect that shifts the entire
paths of kt and Ut downward.
5.2 Technological Progress
To ensure the robustness of the results obtained so far, here we conﬁrm that the inclusion of
technological progress does not signiﬁcantly change the pattern of cycles induced by delayed
childbearing. Assume that in every period there is exogenous technological progress that
increases labor productivity by a factor of ° > 1. When labor productivity at period 0
is normalized to unity, production per worker can be represented as yt = A°
tk®t , where
kt ´ Kt=(°tLt) now represents the amount of capital per eﬃciency unit of labor. Note that
the amount of labor income for each worker (not eﬃciency unit) should be modiﬁed from
(13) to wt = A(1¡ ®)°tk®t , whereas the expression for rt is the same as (12). Then, instead
of (14), we obtain the evolution of kt ´ Kt=(°tLt) as:
kt+1 =
A (1¡ ®)
°
Ntk
®
t + zNt¡1
£¡
A®k®¡1t + 1¡ ±
¢
k®t¡1=° + k
®
t
¤
Nt+1 +Nt
: (32)
Figure 9 shows the path of kt in the presence of yearly labor productivity growth of 2%,
i.e., when labor productivity is multiplied by ° = 1:49 ¼ (1+0:02)20 in each period. It looks
almost the same as the reference case of Figure 4(ii), but the level of the whole path is lower
than the equilibrium without technological progress. This is because technological progress
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Figure 10: Pattern of Cycles with Technological Progress (° = 1:49, ± = 0:33)
expands the labor force measured in eﬃciency units, and thus dilutes capital per eﬃciency
unit of labor.
Figure 10(i) depicts the pattern of cycles in kt for various ¯ and ¸, under ° = 1:49 and
± = 0:33. When it is compared with the two panels in Figure 5, this phase diagram matches
more closely the high-depreciation case of Figure 5(ii), where ± = 0:64 (5% annum), rather
than the reference case with the same depreciation rate (± = 0:33). This result suggests
that technological progress aﬀects the pattern of cycles in kt in a similar way to a higher
depreciation rate. Note that while technological progress in a given period enhances total
output Yt in that period, the amount of remaining capital after depreciation (1 ¡ ±)Kt is
unaﬀected because the latter is determined by the savings in the previous period. Therefore,
technological progress reduces (1 ¡ ±)Kt=Yt, and hence lowers the proportion of income
received by the middle-aged agents (who have claims on the remaining capital).
We also examined the pattern of cycles in the utility of generations, Ut. Note that, even
in the steady state, labor income wt increases by a factor of ° in each period. By substituting
wt = A(1¡®)°tk®t into (27), it can be observed that the utility of generations has a trend term
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(1 + ¯)(log °)t. Therefore, after calculating the path of Ut for each ¯ and ¸ by substituting
the path of kt into (27), we removed the trend by subtracting (1 + ¯)(log °)t from it, and
then examined the pattern of the cycles in the detrended path of Ut. Figure 10(ii) shows that
the result is similar to Figure 6(ii). This conﬁrms that the eﬀects of technological progress
on the cycles of kt and Ut are similar to the eﬀects of a higher depreciation rate.
6 Concluding Remarks
In a simple overlapping generations model, we examined the eﬀects of delayed childbearing
on capital accumulation and the welfare of generations. A notable feature of the delayed
childbearing economy is that it causes ﬂuctuations in the age composition of workers for a
long period of time. As workers at diﬀerent life stages have diﬀerent sources of income and
also diﬀerent saving propensities, ﬂuctuations in the age composition aﬀect the aggregate
saving rate, causing cycles in the capital–labor ratio. The cycles in the capital–labor ratio
cause the lifetime welfare of agents to change generation by generation in an alternating
fashion. Depending on the parameters, the majority of agents can experience lower lifetime
welfare when the cycles in the capital–labor ratio aﬀect the factor prices in such a way that
their income in the early stage of their life falls. We also examined extensions of the model
with declining population and technological progress, and conﬁrmed the robustness of our
results.
Although our model is very stylized, it gives insights into a possible cause and eﬀects of
ﬂuctuations in the age distribution of the labor force, which have been examined in diﬀerent
contexts in the literature. For example, Lee (1997) pointed out that baby booms and busts
can cause ﬂuctuations in the age structure. Mankiw and Weil (1989) investigated their
eﬀects on the US housing market. Our analysis suggests that delayed childbearing can also
generate ﬂuctuations in the age distribution of workers, which have diﬀerential welfare eﬀects
on cohorts.
This paper attempted to analyze the eﬀects of the age distribution on capital accumu-
lation and economic welfare as intuitively as possible. For this reason, our model treated
the timing of childbirth and the number of children as exogenous. However, in analyzing
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the implications of policies that aim to cope with delayed childbearing and the low fertility
rate, it will be necessary to clarify how agents endogenously choose the timing of their child-
bearing and the number of children. It will also be interesting to investigate the endogenous
relationship between delayed childbearing and declining lifetime fertility rate, which in this
study we assumed are independent. The exploration of these issues is left for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of property (ii): From (22) and (25), Vodd(z) · v¤(z) is equivalent to:
1 + z ¸ z ®1+®
n
2 (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+® ¡ ®z 1¡®1+®
o
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® ´ ½odd(z): (33)
Calculating ½0odd (z) and ½
00
odd (z), we obtain:
½0odd (z) =
®
1 + ®
z¡
1
1+®
n
2 (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+® ¡ z 1¡®1+®
o
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® ; (34)
½00odd (z) = ¡
µ
®
1 + ®
¶2
z¡
2+®
1+®
½
2
®
(1¡ ®) 1¡®1+® ¡ z 1¡®1+®
¾
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® :
Note that ½odd (z) = 0 holds at z = 0 and
¡
2
®
¢ 1+®
1¡® (1¡ ®). In addition, ½odd (z) > 0 and
½00odd (z) < 0 hold if and only if z 2
³
0;
¡
2
®
¢ 1+®
1¡® (1¡ ®)
´
. The left-hand side of (33) is
linear with respect to z, and the right-hand side, ½odd (z), has an inverted-U shape while
it is positive. From Lemma 1(i), (33) holds as an equality at z = 1 ¡ ®. Moreover, from
½0odd (1¡ ®) = ®= (1¡ ®2), ½0odd (1¡ ®) < 1 holds because we have assumed ® <
¡p
5¡ 1¢ =2.
From these properties, Figure 11 (left) shows that there exist two values of z that satisfy
(33) as an equality. One is z = 1 ¡ ® from Lemma 1(i), and the other solution bz satisﬁes
0 < bz < 1¡ ®. ¥
Proof of property (iii): From (21) and (25), Veven(z) · v¤(z) is equivalent to:
1 + z ¸ z ®1+®
n
2z
1¡®
1+® ¡ ® (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+®
o
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® ´ ½even(z): (35)
Calculating ½0even (z) and ½
00
even (z), we obtain:
½0even (z) =
1
1 + ®
z¡
1
1+®
n
2z
1¡®
1+® ¡ ®2 (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+®
o
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® ;
½00even (z) = ¡
µ
®
1 + ®
¶2
z¡
2+®
1+®
½
2
®
z
1¡®
1+® ¡ (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+®
¾
(1¡ ®)¡ 11+® :
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Figure 11: Graphs of Functions ½odd(z) and ½even(z)
Note that ½even (z) = 0 holds at z = 0 and
¡
®
2
¢ 1+®
1¡® (1¡ ®). In addition, ½even (z) > 0 and
½00even (z) < 0 hold if and only if z >
¡
®
2
¢ 1+®
1¡® (1¡ ®). The left-hand side of (35) is linear with
respect to z, and the right-hand side, ½even (z), is strictly concave when ½even (z) > 0. In
addition:
½even (1) = (1¡ ®)¡
1
1+®
h
2¡ ® (1¡ ®) 1¡®1+®
i
> (1¡ ®)¡ 11+® (2¡ ®) > (1¡ ®)¡ 12 (2¡ ®) ¸ 2:
Therefore, as depicted in Figure 11 (right), z = 1¡ ® is the unique solution in the range of
z 2 (0; 1). ¥
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of property (i): When ¸ = 1, the deﬁnition of vt in (17) and equation (18) implies
k¤odd= (A (k
¤
even)
®) = 1¡ ®. Using this equation, (28) is rewritten as:
U¤even = (1 + ¯) [® log k
¤
odd ¡ log (1¡ ®)¡ z (1¡ ®) log k¤even] + C: (36)
Similarly, when ¸ = 0, we have k¤= (A (k¤)®) = v¤(z). Using this equation, (29) is rewritten
as:
U¤ = (1 + ¯)
·
® log k¤ + log
·
®
v¤(z)
+ 1
¸
¡ z (1¡ ®) log k¤
¸
+ C: (37)
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Note that, from (23), (24) and (26), log k¤odd ¡ log k¤ = 11¡® (log Vodd(z)¡ log v¤(z)) and
log k¤even¡ log k¤ = 11¡® (log Veven(z)¡ log v¤(z)) hold. Using these, we eliminate k¤, k¤odd and
k¤even from the diﬀerence between (36) from (37) to get U
¤
even ¡ U¤ = (1 + ¯)Ω (z). ¥
Proof of property (ii): Using (21) and (22), (30) is rewritten as:
Ω (z) ´¡ log (1¡ ®)
·
®
v¤ (z)
+ 1
¸
+
µ
z ¡ ®
1¡ ®
¶
log v¤ (z)
+
®
1¡ ®2 [log (1¡ ®) + ® log z]¡
z
1¡ ® [® log (1¡ ®) + log z] :
(38)
As limz!0 log z = ¡1, limz!0 z log z = 0 and v¤ (0) = (1¡ ®)=2, the right-hand side of (38)
diverges to minus inﬁnity as z ! 0. From Lemma 1(i) and (30), we immediately obtain
Ω (1¡ ®) = 0. ¥
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